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IN THE SlJPf<.E!';,fE COURT 
OF T'HE STATE OF u-TAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COl\E\IISSION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
NELTMAN C. PETTY and IREY.A 
G. PE TTY, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10354 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The State of Utah, by and through its Road Com-
mission, has appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah by virtue of leave to take an interlocutory 
appeal from a decision of the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow, Judge, of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, requiring the appellant to answer inter-
rogatories submitted by the respondents Neuman C. 
1 
Petty and Ireva G. Petty, and awarding the 
respond. 
ents the sum of $75 attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOlVER COURT 
The appellant filed its complaiut to condemn cer-
tain property for the purposes of acquiring controlled. 
access facilities and public highways on J anuarv 24 . ,
1964. An order of occupancy was granted on January 
31, 1964. Various defendants were named to the co~­
demnation action. The only parties with which this 
appeal is concerned are the defendants Neuman C 
Petty and Ireva G. Petty, his wife. The parties filed 
an answer to the appellant's complaint on August 19. 
1964. On December 24, 1964, the respondents served 
a demand for interrogatories upon the appellant. An· 
swers to those interrogatories were filed on March 1, 
1965. On March 2, 1965, respondents filed objections 
to the answers to interrogatories and a motion for 
attorney's fees. On l\Iarch 29, 1965, the court below 
entered an order, granting respondents attorney's fees 
and ordering that the appellant more fully answer the 
interrogatories asked by the respondents. An interlocu· 
tory appeal was granted on the 29th day of June, 1965. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
. 1 t's The appellant seeks reversal of the tria cour. 
order compelling appellant to answer the interrogatories 
posed by the respondents and awarding the respondents 
attorney's fees. 
2 
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STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The appellant submits the following statement of 
fads. In the instant action, appellant sought to acquire 
property, in which respondents claimed an interest, for 
highway purposes ( H. 1 through 10). The answer filed 
by the respondents left in issue only the value of their 
interest to Parcel No. 181 :13 described in appellant's 
complaint (R. 19). 
On December 24<, 1964, the respondents served 
interrogatories on appellant. The relevant interroga·-
tories on contest in this appeal request the following 
information: 
"I. Please set forth the names and addresses 
of the witnesses plaintiff intends to call at the 
time of trial in the abo'\'e captioned case." 
"3. Please set forth what you contend to be 
the fair value of the taken property and in con-
nection with answering this question, please give 
the following values: 
a. The value of the land itself. 
b. The value of improvements, to wit: the 
building. 
c. The value of underground impro'bCments 
to wit: septic tank, water line and gas line. 
d. Y alue of razed building as a whole when 
connected to the metal shed which remains. 
e. Damage to property as the same '\Vas ef-
fected bv reformation of the street and 
frontage. taken being irregular in shape and 
no longer accessible, if any." 
3 
"4. 'Vhat does plaintiff contend to be th h' h 
est and best use of the propertv which ,,, e ig · 
d d f 1 . . • "as con. emne as o t ie time of service of swum ,, ons. 
?n 1.Harch ~· H)()5, the appellant filed answers to the 
mt~rr~gator1cs. 1 '~'he appellant'~ ans\vers to Interroga-
tones 3 and 4 clauned that the mformation sought was 
privileged and that appellant had no opinion outside 
of its expert witnesses as to the highest and best use 
of respondents' property. 
Objections to the answers to the interrogatories 
were filed by respondents (R. 32). The objection to 
the answer to Interrogatory No. I was that the ad-
dresses of plaintiff's witnesses were not stated. The 
objection to the answer to Interrogatory No. 4 was 
that it was not answered. The objection to the answer 
to Interrogatory No. 3 was that the information sought 
was not privileged and that appellant had not timely 
objected to the interrogatory. Further, respondents 
sought an award of attorney's fees for having to bring 
the motion to compel answers. 
On March 29, 1965, the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow ordered appellants to answer respondent's inter· 
rogatories and awarded respondents the sum of $75 for 
attorney's fees. It is submitted that this order was 
erroneous. 
. . f'l d b Attorney General 
1 The original condemnat10n action was 1 e .{ t' e the demand 
A. Pratt Kesler. During the period betwe!!1 t eth~manswers were 
for interrogatories was served and the ime d ffice 
filed, Attorney General Phil L. Hansen assume 0 · 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDER-
lXG APPELLANT TO ANS,VER RESPOND-
ENT~' INTERROGATORIES WITH GREAT-
ER PARTICULARITY. 
It is submitted that each of the interrogatories posed 
by the respondents, which are relevant to this appeal, 
,rere improper and objectionable. Interrogatory No. 
J asked the appellant to set forth the names and ad-
dres:,es of all witnesses "plaintiff intends to call at the 
time of trial * * *." It is well settled that such a ques-
tion is completely improper. 
Interrogatories, under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, are merely a written means of in-
quiring into matter in the possession of another party. 
They are subject to the same limitations as questions 
in the taking of a deposition. In Moore's Federal P.·ac-
tice, Paragraph 26.19 [4}, it is stated: 
"Relative to the second purpose mentioned in 
subhead [l} supra, whether a party may be re-
quired at a proper time to state the names and 
addresses of witnesses then known and which he 
proposed to introduce at trial, the weight of re-
ported authority is that a party is not required 
so to do." 
In Coydill v. Tennessee Valley Authority (E.D., 
Tenn. 1947), 7 :F'.R.D. 411, such a question was held 
objectionable and the court stated: 
5 
" * * * If it asks then to commit the 1 · l . mse ves 
11
1
1
1 
alfvahnce to duse certam designated witnesses 
a o t em an none other, that would call,,· 
t f. d . !fl[ an ac o angerous unprudence and 1't ll 
b . l ' W001 not e fair to impose such a handicap." 
Thus, the overwhelming weight of precedent suppor\\ 
a conclusion that Interrogatory No. 1 posed bv the 
respondents is improper. Fidelis Fisheries, Ltd. ,., 
11horden, 12 l<-..R.D. 179 ( S.D., New York l9j21 
Truck Drivers and Helpers Local v. Grosshans a~~ 
Peterson, Inc., 209 F.Supp. 161 (D.C., Kan. l9fl2): 
:Moore, supra, 26.19[4), pages 1247-1250. 
It is further submitted that in spite of the fact that 
Interrogatory No. 1 was objectionable, appellant did 
substantially answer the question. In the answer semd 
by the appellant, three individuals were named and 
it was indicated that all were residents of Salt Lake 
City. This is undoubtedly sufficient information for 
the respondents' needs. 
Interrogatory No. 3 requested that the appellant 
supply the respondents with certain figures which the 
appellant contended to be the fair market value of the 
property taken. It is submitted that this question.~ 
objectionable as calling for information in violation 
of Rule 30 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that 
it calls for the opinion of appellant's experts and the 
work product of appellant's counsel. Rule 30(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
" * * * The court shall not order the froduc· 
· · btamed or tion or inspection of any wr1tmg o 
6 
prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, 
surety, indenmitor, or agent, in anticipation of 
litigation or in preparation for trial unless satis-
fied that denial of production or inspection will 
unfairly prejudice the party seeking the pro-
duction or inspection in preparing his claim or 
defense or will cause him undue hardship or in-
justice. The court shall not order the production 
or inspection of any part of the writing that re-
flects an attorney's men~al impressions, conclu-
sions. opinions, or legal theories, or, except as 
provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an ex-
t " per. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
·' * * * The provisions of Rule 30 (b) are ap-
plicable for the protection of the party from 
whom answers to interrogatories are sought un-
der this rule." 
The information sought in the interrogatories 
obYiously asked for appraisals made by appellant's 
appraisers submitted in appraisal reports to appellant's 
counsel. Consequently, to the extent that this informa-
tion is sought by interrogatories, it is objectionable. 
In Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 
224< (1952), this court, as to the limitation on Rule 35, 
stated: 
"This provision deals only with subjective mat-
ters, not with evidence of what the objective 
facts, that is occurrences, conditions and circum-
stances, are, but ,~:ith conclusions from or of 
other evidence of such fact or facts which have 
personal coloring. It forbids discovery of any 
part of a writing which reflects an attorney's 
7 
mental impressions, conclusions opi'n· 
tl · . ' ions or le l ieories, sometimes called the work p d ga 
tt d ro uct of a a ·orney, an the conclusions of an n 
l ·b· d" expert It pro 11 its Iscovery absolutely of all su l · 
d t l ff . · c 1 matters an o t iat e ect IS clear positive an l 'th · . S . . ' l w1 out 
exception. o the trial court erred in hold' tl 
th. I ·b· · d mg iat IS pro 11 Ihon oes not applv to expert · · 
h . .J • • oprruon w ~r~ a ?emal would cause prejudice, hardshi 
or mJushce." P 
This case is clear precedent against requiring appellant 
to answer respondents' Interrogatory No. 3. 
The respondents' request in the instant case asks 
for not only matters which involve communications 
from experts employed by the appellant for the litiga· 
tion but information in the possession of counsel. Rule 
30 ( b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was drawn 
specifically to protect such information from disclosure 
in the absence of a showing of "prejudice." Mower!'. 
McCarthy, supra. The Utah rule was drawn to be more 
protective than the Federal rule. See Compiler's Note, 
Rule 30 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah An· 
notated, 1953, Vol. 9, page 559-560. 
In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that disclosure of 
witnesses' statements obtained for litigation and held 
by counsel need not be disclosed. At least three reports 
were obtained in the instant case as can be seen from 
appellant's answers to Interrogatories l and 2. Inter· 
rogatory No. 3 asks for various values and, of neces· 
sity, would require an analysis of the three reports. 
8 
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Obriously, this is an inquiry into the "work product" 
of appellant's counsel. 
Further, since respo!ldcnt seeks matters of evidence, 
m effect, from appellant's experts, communicated to 
appellant's counsel, inquiry is sought into the lawyer-
client relationship. In Hust v. Roberts, 171 Cal. App. 
2d 772, 341 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1959), interrogatories were 
.~ougi1t from the State of California in a condemnation 
proceeding. The values of the lands condemned were 
requested, which information was the subject of reports 
from expert appraisers hired by the State. In holding 
inquiry was improper, the court observed: 
"Interrogatories 6 to 10 deal with appraisals 
of the property which have been made by the 
State, request the names and addresses of the 
appraisers, and the contents of the appraisers' 
reports. It appears by affidavits presented to 
the trial court that the attorneys for the State 
requested the State to employ appraisers to go 
upon the property to investigate its nature and 
uses, to appraise its value, and to report. It 
also appears that these things were done and 
that the State communicated the matters re-
ported and delivered the reports to its attorneys 
in confidence. The State has claimed that these 
matters are privileged under the attorney-client 
privilege declared by statute. The claim is good." 
In City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halstead Building 
Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 143 N.E .. 2d 40 (1957), infor-
mation concerning the a pp raised value of land in a 
condemnation proceeding was sought. In holding the 
9 
appellant not entitled to the information tl 
1 d ' ie court rue : 
"Irrespective of the holding in the St 
l d f d anczak cas~.' t le e ~n bant
1 
wa~ not entitled to the infor-
ma ~on soug t. y t le .discovery proceedings. The 
undisputed evidence 1s that the appra1'sals 
d b h . · were ma e ! t e two witnesses as experts in the real 
estat~ field ~t the re~ue~t o.f counsel for plaintiff 
for his use m the trial. fh1s being true the e ... 
d . ·1 l ' \l ence was pr1n egec and need not be disclosed 
either at time discovery is sought or at the trial." 
Further, many courts have ruled that it is inher-
ently unfair to allow a party without expense to obtain 
the information held by another. United States v. Cer-
tain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98 (D.C., Ga. 1955); 
Moore's Federal Practice, Para. 26.24; Friedenthal, 
Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert In-
formation, 14 Stanford Law Review 455, 479 (1962). 
It is apparent, therefore, that respondents' questions. 
to the extent they seek privileged information and in-
f . . d f i/}'I ormabon receive rom experts, are1proper. 
Interrogatory No. 4 requests the position of appel-
lant as to the highest and best use of the respondents' 
property. This question is equally improper. Not only 
does it seek information privileged under Rule 30(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but it goes beyond the 
scope of Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
· · · t f t and seeks information that is beyond mqmry mo ac s 
seeks appellant's legal theories. In Rust v. Roberts, 
· ·1 est· supra, the California court answered a slffii ar requ · 
10 
"Interrogatories 13 through 19 request that 
the State inform petitioners what use it contends 
is the highest and best use of the land and as 
to the facts upon which such contention is based. 
Such matters are not relevant to the issue of 
rnlue. being merely arguments and theories that 
the State may advance through its witnesses on 
rnlue. Indeed, the State may well want to use 
a witness with whose theories as to use of the 
property the State does not agree. The State's 
contentions cannot be put in evidence even 
though its expert witnesses will, in all proba-
bility, when testifying on value, testify also as 
to what is the highest and best use of the prop-
erty. They will probably also testify as to the 
various uses to ·which the property can be put. 
But the State's contentions pro or con upon the 
subject matter of the interrogatories are not 
proper subjects of discov-ery. * * * Evidence 
may be given by either party as to the uses to 
which the property may be put and answers to 
the interrogatories would neither confine peti-
tioners in the scope of their proof nor prevent 
the State's witnesses from testifying ~s to a use 
which in their opinion is the highest and best 
use of the property. 'Ve see no useful purpose 
to be served by these interrogatories." 
Payer, Hewitt & Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 26 F.R.D. 
219 (D.C., Del. 1960), it was observed: 
" * * * It is well settled that opinions and legal 
conclusions may not be required by interroga-
tories." 
See Moore's Federal Practice, Paragraph 33.17, to the 
same effect as respects requests for legal contentions. 
11 
Further, it is submitted that appellant . 
I d d f. . . . is not pre. c u e rom ra1smg its contentions hecau f f . 
. . se o a a1lure 
to ob.Ject to the mterrogatories when thev 
. . . were served. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Cini Procedure ·d , prov1 es: 
" * "'" * ,V. I. ··· · it im 10 da vs after service of · t · · · m er. 
rogatories a partv mav serve writte11 ob' t' · . · . Jee ions ~her~to together '~~th a noh~e of hearing the ob. 
Jechons at the earliest practicable time An . ,_ . . . · swers 
to mterrogaLor1es to. which ob.Jection is made 
sh:ill be deferred uubl the objedions are deter. 
mined.'' 
The rule is written in permissive terms, which would 
indicate that objections ought to be raised within 10 
days, but that it is not necessarily fatal. Moore, supra, 
33.27, notes: 
"In addition to the prov1s1on for objections 
to interrogatories, which has always been in the 
Rule, Rule 33 now contains a provision that 'The 
provisions of Rule 30 (b) are applicable for the 
protection of the party from whom answers to 
interrogatories are sought under this rule.' The 
Advisory Committee's Note to the 1946 amend· 
ment indicates that this sentence was inserted, 
not to limit the scope of discovery under ~ul.e 
33 but in an attempt to remove some of the !um· 
tations which some courts had placed on the use 
of interrogatories. Even before the am~ndme?t, 
the courts had •.vide discretion in dealmg with 
objections to interrogatories. The amendment. 
however makes it clear that anv of the orders ' • . t 
mentioned in Rule 30 (b) may, when appropn~, e .. 
be made as to interrogatories under Rule 33. 
12 
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It would seem from Moore's statement that the 
concept of privilege and work product under Rule 
3o(b) is in addition to the objections that might other-
wise be raised and that if an answer would be objection-
able under Rule 30 ( b), the failure to object within 
10 days would not necessarily preclude proper objec-
tion. Indeed, if the failure to object within IO days were 
to be deemed an absolute waiver, an effective means 
will, in many cases, be shown to circumvent the pro-
tections of the rule. At least two cases have recognized 
that the failure to object to propounded interrogatorie:; 
within IO days does not absolutely bar a party from 
challenging the request. In Bohlin v. Brass Rail Inc., 
20 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), the court said that 
normally objections within the 10-day period would 
he required, but thereafter exceptions were noted. The 
court stated: 
"I am not prepared, however, to hold that the 
failure to file objections to interrogatories con-
stitutes a waiver of either the privilege which 
plaintiff may have as to reports of his own physi-
cian or as to statements of witnesses which have 
been obtained by his counsel in the course of 
preparation for trial to which defendant would 
not be entitled under the rule of Hickman v. 
Taylor. 
"Plaintiff therefore will not be directed to 
comply with that portion of interrogatory 9 
which requires her to supply the defendant with 
copies of reports and records of her own physi-
cians, nor with the portion of interrogatory 17 
which requires directly or by implication dis-
13 
closure of statements of witnesses which . 
b. · l l l · 'ff" · "ere o Iame< . >y fp am~1 · s attorney m the course of 
preparation or trial and are his work product." 
In Ba.rtcr v. Vick, 25 F.R.D. 229 (ED p . ., a. 
1960), the court ruled that the JlermissiYe lai1rru· ' M arre 
of Hule 33 gives the person who must answer the alt~:. 
native of answering or objecting. The court said that 
the failure to answer in 10 days would normally he a 
waiver, but acknowledged: 
"Although we ha\'e determined that defendant 
has waived its objections to the interro~atory, 
we would hesitate to enforce this waiYer if ,~·e 
felt that it would cast an undue burden on de-
fendant or otherwise would be contrary to the 
interests of justice. See Cleminsaw v. Bdech Air-
craft Corp., supra, and Bohlin v. Brass Rail, 
I " nc., supra. 
In the instant case, since the interrogatories call 
for privileged information, there can be no valid claim 
of waiver because of any failure to file objections within 
10 days. 
Finally, it should be noted that during the time 
for filing objections, there was a change of Attorneys 
General, and, thus, counsel responsible for the suit. 
Certainly, the people of Utah should not be prejudiced 
by their choice and a case for equity is apparent. In 
addition, to the extent Interrogatory No. 4 seeks legal 
conclusions, it wholly exceeds the scope of Rule 33 
and should be disallowed. 
It is submitted that this court should reverse. 
14 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN A'VARDING 
RESPONDENTS ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The trial court awarded respondents $75 attorney's 
fees for the respondents' obtaining the order compelling 
appellant to answer interrogatories. It is submitted 
that since in Point I of this brief it is shown that the 
appellant's refusal to answer as particularly as re-
spondents would desire is justified, any award of 
attorney's fees was improper. 
Even if it is determined that the respondents are 
entitled to have their interrogatories answered, they 
are still not entitled to attorney's fees. Rule 37, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
"Upon the refusal of a deponent to answer 
any interrogatory submitted under Rule 31 or 
upon the refusal of a party to answer any inter-
rogatory submitted under Rule 33, the propo-
nent of the question may on like notice make like 
application for such an order. If the motion is 
granted and if the court finds that the refusal 
was without substantial justification the court 
shall require the refusing party or deponent and 
the party or attorney advising the refusal or 
either of them to pay the examining party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in 
obtaining the order, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees." 
It is submitted, however, that this rule may not 
be applied to the State of Utah. The State has not 
consented to the burden of being required to pay at-
15 
torney's .fee.s .or costs. Indeed, R~1le 54(d) (1), l;tah 
Rules of C1v1l Procedure, recogmzes this, for it pro. 
vides: 
;.' * * * Costs against the st~te of Utah, its 
ofbcers and ag~nc1es shall be imposed onlv to 
the extent perrmtted by law." · 
No law has allowed the imposition of costs or attornev\ 
fees in this case. · 
This court has consistently ruled that the State wa~ 
immune from suit where it has not consented. Spring-
ville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 U.2d 100, :349 P.2<l 
157 (1960); Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, IO l'.2<l 
417, 354 P.2d 105 ( 1960) ; State v. Tedesco, 4 C.2<l 
31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955); State Road Commission v. 
Parker, 13 U.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 ( 1962). It is sub-
mitted that to the extent the court below awarded 
attorney's fees, it imposed a monetary judgment against 
the State of Utah without its consent. Certainly, by 
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this court did 
not purport to waive the State's immunity by allowing 
attorney's fees to be imposed. To do so would go beyond 
the rule-making power of the court and enter the reahn 
of substantive legislation and, consequently, be uncon· 
stitutional, since Article VI, Section 1, Constitution 
of Utah, vests the legislative power in the Legislature 
and Article V, Section 1, provides for the separation 
of powers between the branches of State government. 
Further, the Constitution of Utah, Article YII, Sec· 
tion 13, gives the Board of Examiners the power. to 
consider claims against the State of Utah, thus mi· 
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liedlv raising sovereign immunity to a constitutional ~octri~e. In State Road Commission v. Parker, 13 
C.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962), it was stated: 
" * * * any drainage of taxpayers' funds by 
abolition of the doctrine, is the subject of legis-
lative attention in our tri-partite system of gov-
ernment,-not the courts." 
Since the Legislature has not seen fit to allow 
recoYery of attorney's fees against the State in this 
case, Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should 
not be so construed. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case presents an attempt by the re-
spondents to obtain privileged information and the 
work product of appellant's counsel and experts. The 
precedent is clear that such an attempt is not proper 
under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
disclosure of such information would be detrimental 
and harsh to the appellant's position. 
The respondents' award of attorney's fees cannot 
stand in the face of the illegality of the requests for 
answers to interrogatories and the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. To so allow would open a Pandora's Box 
of constitutional issues. 
This court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
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